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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal requires us to apply the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), to a drug conspiracy sentence. At sentencing, the 
trial court, adhering to established law and custom, itself 
decided the issue of drug quantity under a preponderance 
of the evidence standard. Based largely on this finding, the 
court sentenced appellant, Alex Vazquez, to a prison term 
of 292 months (24 years and 4 months), which exceeded, 
by over 4 years, the statutory maximum authorized by the 
jury's factual findings. Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
held in Apprendi that a criminal defendant's constitutional 
rights are violated when his prescribed statutory maximum 
penalties are increased by any fact, other than a prior 
conviction, that a jury does not find beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 490. Vazquez now challenges his sentence 
contending that, because the court did not submit the 
issue of drug quantity to the jury for determination, he 
must be resentenced in accordance with the default 20-year 
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statutory maximum sentence that applies to cocaine 
offenses of unspecified drug quantity. 
 
Vazquez did not contest the drug quantity evidence at 
any stage of the proceedings. As a result, our review is for 
plain error. We conclude that Vazquez's sentence violated 
Apprendi, and therefore, the failure to submit drug quantity 
to the jury, and the imposition of a prison term in excess 
of 20 years, was erroneous. Nonetheless, because we 
remain confident that a rational jury would have found, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the drug quantities that the 
judge found, we conclude that Vazquez is not entitled to 




The relevant facts are largely undisputed. On February 
27, 1998, after a lengthy investigation, law enforcement 
authorities seized a quantity of powder cocaine and crack 
cocaine from a rooming house in Columbia, Pennsylvania. 
Vazquez's fingerprint was on one of the bags in which the 
cocaine had been stored. 
 
The next day, officers executed a search warrant at 
Vazquez's residence. There, police seized a digital scale 
from Vazquez's bedroom, a key to the front door of the 
rooming house, and a stolen firearm. Thereafter, state law 
enforcement authorities and agents from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") interviewed a number of 
Vazquez's drug customers, including James Freeland, Brian 
Holmes, and Wayne Rice. All three gave statements 
implicating Vazquez and Francisco Algarin in a drug 




1. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. This 
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). 
 
The parties originally argued this case before a merits panel of our 
court on December 15, 2000. However, given the importance of the 
Apprendi issue, we elected to consider the case en banc prior to the 
publication of the original three-judge panel opinion. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
9.4 (2000). 
 
                                4 
 
 
On June 9, 1998, a grand jury for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania issued an indictment charging Vazquez with 
conspiracy to possess and distribute "more than 5 kilos of 
cocaine" in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 846 and 841, several 
related counts of obstruction of justice (including one under 
18 U.S.C. S 1503), and two counts of witness tampering. 
The indictment specifically charged a drug conspiracy 
involving "cocaine." Although it did not reference cocaine 
base or crack cocaine, it listed the following overt act: 
"stor[ing] approximately 859 grams of `crack' cocaine 
(cocaine base) and approximately 992 grams of cocaine 
powder in Room #2, 647 Union Street, Columbia, PA." 
 
The trial evidence, which included testimony based on a 
forensic lab analysis, established that police seized 991 
grams of powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine 
from the Columbia rooming house.2 According to the 
testimony, Vazquez had given the drugs to his co- 
conspirator, Algarin, for storage at the rooming house, and 
Vazquez's fingerprint was found on one of the bags in 
which the cocaine was stored. Also, a key to the front door 
of the rooming house was found on Vazquez's person. 
Vazquez raised no objection to the testimony respecting 
drug quantity, and he presented no affirmative evidence at 
any time challenging the Government's evidence of drug 
quantity. Additionally, neither the Government nor Vazquez 
requested an instruction requiring the jury to find the 
quantity of drugs involved in his conspiracy offense, and 
the court gave no such instruction. The District Court's 
instructions concerning the drug conspiracy only required 
the jury to find that Vazquez conspired "to possess and 
distribute cocaine." Following deliberations, the jury 
convicted Vazquez of conspiracy to possess and distribute 
cocaine, as well as obstruction of justice. However, the jury 
acquitted Vazquez of a conspiracy to obstruct justice 
charge. In addition, the jury was unable to reach verdicts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A discrepancy of 1 gram exists in the record as to the amount of 
powder cocaine. The trial testimony referred to 991 grams, while the 
District Court found the amount to be 992 grams. Because the 1 gram 
difference is of no substantive import in these proceedings, we will refer 
to the amount as 992 grams. 
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on the two witness tampering counts; the District Court 
declared a hung jury as to those counts. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted the 
factual findings and sentencing recommendations in the 
presentence report. The court determined, without objection 
and under a preponderance of the evidence standard, that, 
based on the trial evidence and the presentence report, 
Vazquez had been involved with 992 grams of powder 
cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine. The court 
therefore assigned Vazquez a base offense level of 36 in 
accordance with U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1's Drug Quantity Table. 
The District Court then applied two separate 2-level upward 
adjustments, the first for being an organizer/leader under 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(c), and the second for attempted 
obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. An adjusted 
offense level of 40 and a criminal history category of I 
resulted in a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months. The 
District Court ultimately sentenced Vazquez at the bottom 
of that range, the guideline minimum of 292 months, for 
the drug conspiracy, and to a concurrent term of 120 
months for the obstruction of justice charge. The court also 
imposed a 5-year supervised release term on the drug 
conspiracy count and a concurrent 3-year supervised 
release term on the obstruction of justice charge. With 
regard to the drug conspiracy, the judgment of conviction 
stated that Vazquez was sentenced for a conspiracy in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846, with the object of distributing 





We begin by explaining why Apprendi was violated in 
Vazquez's case. Thereafter, because Vazquez did not contest 
the evidence of drug quantity before the District Court, we 




3. Specifically, with regard to the drug conspiracy, the judgment of 
conviction identifies the "Title & Section" as"21 U.S.C. S 846," and 
describes the "Nature of Offense" as "Conspiracy to Possess and 
Distribute More Than Five Kilograms of Cocaine." 
 





Vazquez was indicted and tried for conspiracy to possess 
and distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. SS 846 and 841. To explain the relationship 
between Apprendi and S 841, we will briefly review the 
Apprendi decision, and we will then detail how Apprendi 
was violated in this case. 
 
In Apprendi, the defendant had fired several shots into 
the home of an African-American family that had recently 
moved into a New Jersey neighborhood. 530 U.S. at 469. 
After his arrest, he reportedly stated that he did not know 
the occupants personally but did not want African- 
Americans in his neighborhood. Id. at 469. He later, 
however, denied making such a statement. Id. at 469, 471. 
He pled guilty in state court to two counts of second-degree 
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, each of 
which carried a sentencing range of 5 to 10 years. Id. at 
469-70. Subsequently, the prosecutor filed a motion to 
enhance the defendant's sentence pursuant to New Jersey's 
hate crime statute, which authorized an increased 
punishment for first-degree offenses based upon a trial 
judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the defendant had committed the crime with a purpose to 
intimidate a person or group because of race. Id. at 470, 
491-92 (discussing N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 
2000)). After a contested evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
shooting was racially motivated and imposed a 12-year 
sentence on one of the second-degree counts. Id.  at 471. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, 
holding that the New Jersey sentencing procedures violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
doing so, the Court articulated a new rule of constitutional 
law: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 
Further, with the exception for prior convictions, the Court 
endorsed the following concept: " `[I]t is unconstitutional for 
a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of 
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to 
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which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear 
that such facts must be established by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.' " Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 
U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 
In Vazquez's case, drug quantity was neither submitted 
to the jury nor reflected in its verdict. Therefore, 
S 841(b)(1)(C) defines Vazquez's prescribed statutory 
maximum sentence as 20 years. We indicated in United 
States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 2000), petition for 
cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3763 (U.S. 2001), and we hold here, 
that an Apprendi violation only occurs if the drug quantity 
is not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
defendant's sentence under S 841 exceeds 20 years. 
 
In this case, the District Court sentenced Vazquez to 
more than 24 years' imprisonment, specifically 292 months. 
The court increased Vazquez's penalty based on its finding, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had been 
involved with 992 grams of powder cocaine and 859 grams 
of crack cocaine. This nearly 2-kilogram quantity led to 
Vazquez's sentencing guideline range of 292 to 365 months, 
which ultimately resulted in his 292-month sentence. The 
Apprendi violation occurred when the judge, rather than 
the jury, determined drug quantity and then sentenced 
Vazquez to a more than 24-year sentence, a term in excess 
of his prescribed 20-year statutory maximum under 
S 841(b)(1)(C). Our sister courts of appeals have similarly 
applied Apprendi to S 841. E.g. , United States v. Hishaw, 
235 F.3d 565, 574-75 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. 
Ct. 2254 (2001); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 
164 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1152 (2001); 
United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 
2000); see also United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 
524-25 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nordby , 225 F.3d 




We now turn to the consequences of the Apprendi  
violation. Vazquez's strongest argument is that his jury did 
not make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt as to drug 
quantity, and thus, he must be resentenced in accordance 
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with S 841(b)(1)(C)'s 20-year maximum term. According to 
Vazquez, the District Court committed reversible error 
when it imposed a more than 24-year prison term based on 
its own drug quantity finding, which was conducted under 
the less demanding preponderance of the evidence 
standard. As we stated previously, Vazquez neither 
challenged the evidence of drug quantity nor objected to the 
court's failure to submit the issue to the jury. Moreover, he 
never argued that the sentencing court was constrained by 
the 20-year maximum found in S 841(b). Consequently, the 
plain error standard governs Vazquez's request for relief. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 
U.S. 461, 465-66 (1997). Under that standard, "before an 
appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there 
must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] 
substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an 
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a 
forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings." Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); accord United States v. 




The trial court committed error in Vazquez's case. As we 
explained above, the District Court violated Apprendi when 
it increased Vazquez's sentence beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum, based on its own factual finding 
concerning drug quantity, instead of submitting the issue 
to the jury for its determination. Further, Apprendi applies 
retroactively because Vazquez's direct appeal was pending 
at the time Apprendi was decided. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) ("new rule[s] for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions [are] to be applied retroactively to all 
cases . . . pending on direct review . . . , with no exception 
for cases in which the new rule constitutes a `clear break' 




As even the Government concedes, the Apprendi  violation 
that occurred in Vazquez's case was plain. This second 
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factor of the plain error standard is met if the error is 
"obvious" or "clear under current law." Olano, 507 U.S. at 
734. Clearly, had the Government tried Vazquez's case 
post-Apprendi, it would have been constitutional error for 
the District Court to impose a sentence exceeding the 20- 
year maximum in S 841(b)(1)(C) based on the court's 
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, as to drug 
quantity. Thus, the Apprendi violation is plain even though 
the District Court conducted Vazquez's proceedings 
correctly under the then applicable law. See Johnson, 520 
U.S. at 468 ("in a case such as this -- where the law at the 
time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at 
the time of appeal," this second factor is satisfied if the 




Vazquez must next satisfy the third plain error factor, 
which asks whether his substantial rights were affected. 
Before resolving this issue, we will address several 
preliminary matters raised in the parties' arguments 
because our resolution of those matters will significantly 
affect how we conduct the substantial rights inquiry. First, 
we will consider whether an Apprendi violation should be 
deemed a sentencing error (as opposed to a trial error), or 
a combination of a trial and sentencing error. We conclude 
that the latter approach is more consonant with the 
realities of Apprendi violations, as well as Supreme Court 
precedent. Second, we will consider whether an Apprendi 
violation is per se prejudicial because it constitutes a 
structural defect in the proceedings. If so, our plain error 
analysis would come to an end, and we would be compelled 
to grant Vazquez relief. We conclude that Apprendi 
violations do not constitute structural defects. Third, we 
will proceed to consider whether the Apprendi  violation that 
occurred in Vazquez's case affected his substantial rights. 
We conclude that Vazquez's substantial rights were not 
affected. Fourth, we also hold that, even if Vazquez's 
substantial rights were affected, we decline to exercise our 
discretion to notice the Apprendi violation under the final 
plain error factor because the drug quantity evidence was 
overwhelming. Therefore, Vazquez is not entitled to plain 
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error relief even though an Apprendi violation occurred 
during his criminal proceedings. 
 
Parenthetically, in addressing the substantial rights 
inquiry, we will rely on precedent applying Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(a)'s harmless error standard, as well as Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(b)'s plain error standard, each of which provides relief 
only if substantial rights are affected.4  The substantial 
rights inquiry under each provision is essentially identical, 
with the exception of the burden of proof. See Olano, 507 
U.S. at 734-35 (clarifying that Government has burden of 
proof under harmless error standard, while defendant has 
burden under plain error standard); Nordby, 225 F.3d at 
1060. Thus, we may properly rely upon both harmless and 
plain error precedent in deciding whether Vazquez has 
shown that the Apprendi violation affected his substantial 





The parties dispute the nature of Apprendi violations. 
Vazquez claims that the Apprendi violation that adversely 
affects the defendant's rights in most drug cases, including 
this one, is the sentencing decision, not any trial error. 
According to Vazquez, a properly conceived substantial 
rights inquiry, in the context of an Apprendi  violation, 
requires an appellate court to ask whether it can say, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the sentence would have 
been the same absent the sentencing error, which occurred 
when a sentence was imposed in excess of the prescribed 
statutory maximum. See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060. Under 
Vazquez's approach, every Apprendi violation with respect 
to drug quantity in a cocaine case will automatically result 
in a resentencing in accordance with the 20-year maximum 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Rule 52 provides in full: 
 
       (a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which 
       does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. 
 
       (b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial 
rights 
       may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention 
       of the court. 
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sentence under S 841(b)(1)(C), regardless of how conclusive 
the evidence is with regard to drug quantity. 
 
The Government advocates a different approach, urging 
us to recognize that an Apprendi violation involves not just 
a sentencing error but also a trial error. This approach 
emphasizes that, due to the Apprendi violation, drug 
quantity becomes an element of the offense which a jury 
has not determined beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19; Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1060. 
When we conduct plain error review under this paradigm, 
the substantial rights inquiry turns on whether we can say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have 
been the same absent the trial error, which occurred when 
drug quantity was not submitted for a jury determination. 
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (in case 
of trial error resulting from failure to submit element to 
jury, substantial rights inquiry asks whether it is"clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
found the defendant guilty absent the error"); Sochor v. 
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540 (1992) (harmless error asks 
whether error " `did not contribute to the[sentence] 
obtained' ") (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967)). Thus, under the Government's approach, the 
remedy for an Apprendi violation will depend upon the 
entire record, and no remedy may be available if the court 
determines that the evidence was sufficiently conclusive to 
support the sentence actually imposed. However, 
substantial rights will be affected if, for example,"the 
defendant contested the omitted element and raised 
evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding." Neder, 
527 U.S. at 19. 
 
We are persuaded that the Government's approach must 
prevail for two reasons. First, the Government's position 
better reflects the realities concerning the nature of 
Apprendi violations. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court 
recognized a new constitutional right grounded in the Due 
Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury 
trial guarantees. See 530 U.S. at 476. Consistent with the 
Supreme Court's pronouncement of this new constitutional 
right, in an Apprendi violation, the sentencing error 
(imposing a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory 
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maximum) is inextricably intertwined with a trial error 
(failing to submit an element of the offense to the jury). On 
the one hand, the trial error exists only because of the 
sentencing error. On the other hand, the sentencing error 
cannot occur without the trial error. Thus, an appropriate 
remedy must recognize that each Apprendi violation is both 
a trial and a sentencing error. But see United States v. 
Promise, ___ F.3d ___, No. 99-4737, 2001 WL 732389, at *5 
(4th Cir. June 29, 2001) (en banc) (concluding that 
Apprendi violation results from error at sentencing and not 
in defendant's conviction). As a result, we properly consider 
the trial record on plain error review. Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court has stated: "Especially when addressing 
plain error, a reviewing court cannot properly evaluate a 
case except by viewing such a claim against the entire 
record." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985). Our 
holding is consistent with decisions from the First, 5 Fifth,6 
Seventh,7 Eighth,8 Tenth,9 Eleventh,10 and District of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 28 (1st Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 74-75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 
1965 (2001). 
 
6. See United States v. Green, 246 F.3d 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 583-84 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2015 (2001). 
 
7. See United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1080 (7th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Jackson, 236 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); 
cf. United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(considering trial evidence in holding that substantial rights affected). 
 
8. See United States v. Poulack, 236 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2001), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 00-10546 (U.S. June 8, 2001); United States 
v. 
Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 429-30 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); cf. United 
States v. Butler, 238 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (8th Cir. 2001) (considering 
trial evidence in holding that substantial rights affected). 
 
9. See Hishaw, 235 F.3d at 575-77. 
 
10. See United States v. Gallego, 247 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Wims, 245 F.3d 1269, 1272-74 & nn.9-11 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 
1311-12 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2535 (2001); United States 
v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States 
v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829-30 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Swatzie, 228 F.3d 1278, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, No. 00- 
9051, 2001 WL 291894 (U.S. June 29, 2001). 
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Columbia11 Circuits, which, in reviewing Apprendi 
violations, have considered the trial evidence in determining 
whether substantial rights were affected. 
 
Second, we find the Government's approach is more 
consonant with Supreme Court precedent. In both Neder 
and Johnson, the Supreme Court confronted a failure to 
submit an element of the offense to the jury. The omitted 
element in each case was the materiality of a falsehood; a 
tax fraud in Neder and a perjury in Johnson. See 527 U.S. 
at 6-7; 520 U.S. at 463-65. The Court in Neder  and 
Johnson agreed that the error was of a constitutional 
dimension. See 527 U.S. at 12; 520 U.S. at 465 (citing 
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995)). Further, 
each decision addressed whether substantial rights were 
affected; the Neder Court applied harmless error review, 
while the Johnson Court applied plain error review. See 527 
U.S. at 7-10; 520 U.S. at 466-67. The trial error presented 
here is comparable to the errors in both Neder  and Johnson 
because in those cases the trial error resulted in a 
constitutional defect, necessitating an inquiry as to whether 
the defendant's substantial rights were affected. Thus, 
Neder and Johnson apply because we are presented with 
the same substantive issue, namely, the consequence of 




Next, Vazquez argues that the Apprendi violation 
constitutes a structural defect in the proceedings. This 
issue is properly considered at this juncture during the 
course of our substantial rights inquiry. See Johnson, 520 
U.S. at 466 (no structural defect exception to Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 52(b)); id. at 468 (structural defect inquiry is relevant to 
substantial rights inquiry). Structural defects are"defects 
in the constitution of the trial mechanism" that affect "the 
framework within which the trial proceeds," with such a 
resulting impairment in the trial's function of determining 
guilt or innocence that " `no criminal punishment may be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(considering trial evidence in holding that substantial rights affected). 
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regarded as fundamentally fair.' "12  Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) 
(quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)). 
Structural defects lead to automatic reversals because they 
are per se prejudicial. See id. at 307-10 (opinion of 
Rehnquist, C.J.). 
 
We reject Vazquez's contention that Apprendi violations 
constitute structural defects. As we have already explained, 
Apprendi violations result in both trial and sentencing 
errors, albeit ones that rise to a constitutional dimension. 
However, the Supreme Court has instructed that "most 
constitutional errors can be harmless," and that guidance 
applies here. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306 (opinion of 
Rehnquist, C.J.); see also West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 60 
n.7 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated sub nom. on other grounds by 
Tyler v. Cain, 121 S. Ct. 2478 (2001). Trial errors resulting 
from a failure to submit an element of an offense to the jury 
are not structural defects, but instead, are subject to 
harmless or plain error analysis. That is, "an instruction 
that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily 
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an 
unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 9. Similarly, sentencing errors can also 
be harmless. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 
373, 402-05 (1999) (applying harmless error review to 
federal death sentence); United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 
239, 242-46 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying plain error review to 
sentencing judge's failure to assure that defendant had 
read and discussed presentence investigation report with 
his attorney), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1157 (2001). Thus, we 
hold that an Apprendi violation is not a structural defect. 
As far as we are aware, our holding is in accord with every 
court of appeals decision that has addressed this issue. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Examples of structural defects include: (1) the complete denial of 
counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); (2) a biased trial 
judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); (3) racial discrimination 
in the selection of a grand jury, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 
(1986); (4) the denial of self-representation at trial, see McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); (5) the denial of a public trial, see Waller 
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); and (6) defective reasonable doubt 
instructions, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
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See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 930 & n.5 
(11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. 
Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 634 (7th Cir. 2001); 




Having concluded that the Neder and Johnson 
frameworks apply to this case, and that Apprendi  violations 
do not constitute structural defects, we address whether 
Vazquez's substantial rights were affected. During the 
course of this appeal, Vazquez has raised substantial rights 
arguments with regard to both his sentence and conviction. 
We will address each in turn. 
 
We assess Vazquez's challenge to his sentence by 
determining whether it would have been the same absent 
the failure to submit drug quantity for a jury determination. 
We are confident that Vazquez's sentence would have been 
the same had the jury made the drug quantity finding. In 
his case, the evidence established beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Vazquez had been involved with 992 grams of 
powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine. Indeed, 
the sentencing judge, explaining that Vazquez's sentence 
was driven by the quantity of drugs involved, stated that 
"[t]he lab report which was admitted into evidence in this 
case substantiates the amount, and there has never been 
any question about the amount." 
 
In these circumstances, we can say without a doubt that 
Vazquez conspired to possess and/or distribute the 992 
grams of powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine 
the authorities found at the Columbia rooming house. 
Solely on the basis of the uncontested 992 grams of powder 
cocaine, Vazquez would have faced a statutory sentencing 
range of between 5 to 40 years. See 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II). Thus, the slightly more than 24-year 
sentence imposed here fell within the statutory limits 
applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy given the drug 
amount established at trial. Cf. Edwards v. United States, 
523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) (rejecting statutory and 
constitutional challenges to sentences because imposed 
incarceration terms "were within the statutory limits 
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applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy, given the quantities 
of that drug attributed to each petitioner"). 
 
Further, Vazquez's sentence would not have changed 
because the court would have considered the 859 grams of 
crack cocaine for sentencing guideline purposes under the 
Guidelines' relevant conduct provisions. See U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.3 (1998); Edwards, 523 U.S. at 514; Williams, 235 
F.3d at 864. This fact would have led to the same guideline 
sentencing range of 292 to 365 months that the court 
actually applied to Vazquez. No Apprendi problem would 
then exist because the resulting 292-month sentence would 
be less than the 40-year statutory maximum sentence 
under S 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) to which Vazquez was exposed 
solely for his conspiracy offense involving 992 grams of 
powder cocaine. 
 
Vazquez's failure to dispute the amount of cocaine at trial 
or sentencing supports our conclusion that he cannot show 
an effect on his substantial rights. Indeed, he presented 
no challenge to, or affirmative evidence against, the 
Government's evidence of drug quantity. As a result, the 
sentencing judge stated that "there has never been any 
question about the [drug] amount." In a comparable 
situation, the Supreme Court observed: 
 
       [W]here a reviewing court concludes beyond a 
       reasonable doubt that the omitted element was 
       uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, 
       such that the jury verdict would have been the same 
       absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly 
       found to be harmless. We think it beyond cavil here 
       that the error "did not contribute to the verdict 
       obtained." 
 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 (quoting Chapman , 386 U.S. at 24). 
 
In addition to attacking his sentence, Vazquez relies upon 
Apprendi to challenge his conviction. Vazquez contends that 
his substantial rights were affected because, had the trial 
judge properly submitted drug quantity to the jury, he 
necessarily would have been acquitted because the 
evidence the Government presented at trial -- 992 grams of 
powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine -- did not 
support a more than 5-kilogram cocaine conspiracy, as 
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alleged in the indictment. Vazquez also contends that his 
sentence cannot be upheld based upon the 992 grams of 
powder cocaine because doing so would create a material 
variance from the more than 5-kilogram drug quantity 
alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Balter, 91 
F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that "[a] variance 
occurs when `the charging terms are unchanged, but the 
evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those 
alleged in the indictment' ") (quoting United States v. Castro, 
776 F.2d 1118, 1121 (3d Cir. 1985)); United States v. 
Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049, 1059 (3d Cir. 1977) (discussing 
variance concept). 
 
Vazquez's arguments are unavailing. The discrepancy 
between the amount of cocaine stated in the indictment -- 
more than 5 kilograms -- and the amount of powder 
cocaine upon which we uphold Vazquez's sentence-- 992 
grams -- is, for purposes of the substantial rights inquiry, 
immaterial. It is immaterial because the indictment charged 
the 5-kilogram amount, and it is well settled that courts 
"may direct the entry of judgment for a lesser included 
offense when a conviction for a greater offense is reversed 
on grounds that affect only the greater offense." Rutledge v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 292, 306 (1996); accord Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 31(c); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 
705, 716 (1989) (adopting "elements approach" to resolving 
greater/lesser offense issues); cf. United States v. Frorup, 
963 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1992) ("This court will uphold a 
jury verdict convicting a defendant of a lesser offense than 
the one charged if `the evidence would permit a jury 
rationally to find [the defendant] guilty of the lesser offense 
and acquit of the greater.' ") (quoting Keeble v. United 
States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)). Additionally, had the 
court submitted drug quantity to the jury to avoid an 
Apprendi issue, and had Vazquez argued to the jury that 
the evidence did not support a finding that the conspiracy's 
object concerned more than 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, 
the Government would have been entitled to a lesser 
included offense instruction. See Frorup, 963 F.2d at 42 ("A 
jury instruction on [a] lesser included offense is allowable 
as long as there is some evidence to support the 
conviction."). 
 





Even if we were to assume that the Apprendi violation 
affected Vazquez's substantial rights, he cannot establish 
the final plain error factor, namely, that the violation 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. In Johnson , the Supreme 
Court held that, when the evidence of an element wrongly 
taken from a jury "overwhelming[ly]" supports the trial 
court's finding with regard to that element, "there is no 
basis for concluding that the error `seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings,' " and therefore, plain error relief is 
unavailable. See 520 U.S. at 470. 
 
The evidence at trial showed that Vazquez was the leader 
of a drug trafficking operation that distributed powder and 
crack cocaine in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Here, the 
Government presented overwhelming evidence that Vazquez 
conspired with others to possess and distribute a quantity 
of drugs sufficient to justify his sentence. As we previously 
noted, law enforcement officers seized about 992 grams of 
powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine from a 
rooming house. Vazquez had given the drugs to a co- 
conspirator, Francisco Algarin, for storage. The key to the 
rooming house's front door was found on Vazquez's person. 
In addition, investigators found Vazquez's fingerprint on 
one of the bags in which the cocaine was stored. After the 
seizure, police interviewed three of Vazquez's drug 
customers. All three described Vazquez as the leader of a 
drug dealing operation. The trial testimony directly tied 
Vazquez to a drug conspiracy with the co-conspirator, 
Algarin. On the basis of this evidence, including the 
undisputed evidence of drug quantity, a rational jury would 
certainly have found that Vazquez had conspired to possess 
or distribute no less than 992 grams of powder cocaine, 
almost twice the amount necessary to support his slightly 
more than 24-year sentence pursuant to S 841(b)(1)(B)'s 5- 
to-40-year sentencing range. 
 
Under these circumstances, the evidence concerning drug 
quantity was "overwhelming," and, as we explained in the 
preceding section, because Vazquez's sentence would not 
have changed absent the trial error, there is no reasonable 
 
                                19 
 
 
basis upon which to conclude that the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of the judicial proceedings were seriously 
affected. Our holding is in accord with decisions from the 
First,13 Fifth,14 Seventh,15 Tenth,16 and Eleventh17 Circuits, 
in which panels considered the evidence adduced at trial 
and, under the fourth plain error factor, denied relief for 
Apprendi violations where the evidence was conclusive. Our 
holding is also in accord with a recent en banc  decision of 
the Fourth Circuit.18 We therefore conclude that, in light of 
the undisputed evidence of drug quantity attributable to 
Vazquez and our determination that his sentence did not 
exceed the statutory maximum for the cocaine amount 
introduced at trial, the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings were not seriously 




13. See Terry, 240 F.3d at 74-75. 
 
14. See United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 445-46 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 
15. See United States v. Robinson, 250 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Patterson, 241 F.3d 912, 913-15 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 00-10365 (U.S. May 30, 2001); United States 
v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nance, 236 
F.3d 820, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, No. 00-9633 
(U.S. April 24, 2001). 
 
16. See United States v. Wilson, 244 F.3d 1208, 1220 n.7 (10th Cir. 
2001), petition for cert. filed, No. 00-10834 (U.S. June 25, 2001), and 
cert. denied, No. 00-10289, 2001 WL 606873 (U.S. June 29, 2001); 
United States v. Keeling, 235 F.3d 533, 539-40 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, No. 00-10161, 2001 WL 578795 (U.S. June 25, 2001). 
 
17. See Swatzie, 228 F.3d at 1284. 
 
18. See Promise, 2001 WL 732389, at *8-10 & n.9. 
 
19. The Government presents the alternative argument that Vazquez 
should not prevail under the plain error standard because the District 
Court could have justified its 292-month sentence by imposing 
consecutive terms. According to the Government, even if Vazquez had 
been sentenced to S 841(b)(1)(C)'s 20-year maximum term of 
imprisonment on the drug conspiracy conviction, the District Court 
would have been required to impose a consecutive rather than 
concurrent sentence on the obstruction of justice conviction. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3584(a); U.S.S.G. S 5G1.2(d) (1998). Thus, the Government 
submits, because Vazquez would have been subject to the same 292- 
 





Vazquez also challenges the supervised release term that 
the District Court imposed. He contends that the court 
incorrectly applied the 5-year minimum term of supervised 
release under S 841(b)(1)(A), when the minimum term was 
actually 3 years under S 841(b)(1)(C). We note, however, 
that Vazquez did not raise this argument before the District 
Court and he did not brief and argue this issue before the 
panel that initially considered his appeal. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that Vazquez has waived his 
right to pursue this issue here. See Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 245 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc), 
aff 'd 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001); Travitz v. Northeast Dep't 
ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 
1994) ("When an issue is not pursued in the argument 
section of the brief, the appellant has abandoned and 
waived that issue on appeal."). But even if Vazquez had not 
waived the issue, there was no plain error because the 5- 
year supervised release term was clearly within the range 
that the court was authorized to impose under any of 




We have reviewed the additional points on appeal, which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
month term of imprisonment through the imposition of consecutive 
sentences on the conspiracy and obstruction of justice convictions, the 
Apprendi violation did not "affect[ ] the outcome of the district court 
proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; see, e.g., Angle, 2001 WL 732124, 
at *3-4 (holding that substantial rights not violated because S 5G1.2(d) 
would have obligated court to achieve same sentence by imposing 
consecutive terms); Page, 232 F.3d at 544-45 (denying plain error relief 
to defendants convicted on multiple counts becauseS 5G1.2(d) required 
imposition of consecutive sentences to extent necessary to produce 
combined sentence within guideline sentencing range). 
 
We decline to address this contention because we have determined on 
other grounds that Vazquez has failed to establish that he is entitled to 
plain error relief. 
 
                                21 
 
 
we identify in the margin and none of which require 




Accordingly, for the reasons that we have set forth above, 
we will affirm Vazquez's conviction and sentence. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Vazquez asserts that (1) the District Court's pretrial 
disqualification 
of the attorneys he initially obtained, due to their alleged involvement 
in 
the charged obstruction of justice, violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of his choice; (2) his assigned pretrial counsel provided 
ineffective representation in failing to file a motion to suppress the key 
to the rooming house, and the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying as untimely a motion raising that issue that was filed shortly 
before trial by counsel that Vazquez had recently retained; (3) the 
District 
Court committed reversible error in denying his motion for a mistrial, 
and his subsequent motion for a new trial, which were based on alleged 
prejudice he suffered from the jury possibly having learned about his 
prior arrest for possession of a stolen firearm; and (4) the evidence is 
insufficient to support his conviction for obstruction of justice under 18 
U.S.C. S 1503. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, concurring, with whom Judge Ambro 
joins. 
 
Justice Frankfurter may not have been the first to 
observe that "[w]isdom too often never comes, and so one 
ought not to reject it merely because it comes too late," 
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 
595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but he was 
surely right in so declaring. Had he the occasion, he might 
also have observed that sometimes belated wisdom does not 
arrive until a doctrinal shift removes the obstacles to its 
revelation, thereby exposing the unstable foundation of that 
which had been uncritically accepted before. I believe this 
to be such a case. 
 
The doctrinal shift at work here emanates from Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that "any 
fact [other than a prior conviction] that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. This holding in turn 
exposed the instability of our prior holding that under 21 
U.S.C. S 841 drug type and quantity are sentencing factors, 
requiring only proof by a preponderance of the evidence to 
a judge, instead of elements of the offense, which would 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gibbs, 813 F.2d 596, 600 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
Today the Court partially retreats from our prior position 
in holding that, at least when drug quantity increases the 
statutory maximum penalty, it must, per Apprendi , be 
submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. By not re-examining Gibbs and its progeny, however, 
the Court lets stand our interpretation of drug type and 
quantity as sentencing factors in all other instances. 
Indeed, by deciding this case on constitutional rather than 
statutory grounds, see opinion of the Court, ante, at 3, the 
Court implicitly signals that it is satisfied with our prior 
statutory construction of S 841, and will continue to apply 
it in cases where no constitutional -- i.e., Apprendi -- 
difficulty arises. Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346- 
47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (articulating principle 
that cases should be decided on statutory grounds before 
reaching constitutional questions). 
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It has become clear to me, however, upon reconsidering 
S 841 in light of Apprendi, that our prior statutory 
construction ought to be abandoned altogether. I submit 
that drug type and quantity are always elements of an 
offense under S 841, and therefore must always be 
submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) 
("[C]riminal convictions [must] rest upon a jury 
determination that the defendant is guilty of every element 
of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 
doubt."). Concomitantly, I believe that drug type and 
quantity should not be treated as element-like factors only 
when they increase the prescribed statutory maximum 
penalty. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, I am guided primarily by the 
intent of Congress in drafting S 841. In my view, Congress's 
intent to make drug type and quantity elements of aS 841 
offense is evident from the statute's legislative history. It is 
also evident from the structure of S 841, which, when 
interpreted according to the canons of construction used by 
the Supreme Court to distinguish between offense elements 
and sentencing factors, indicates that Congress intended 
for drug type and quantity to be elements of an offense. The 
doctrine of constitutional doubt, which requires that 
"constitutionally doubtful constructions be avoided where 
`fairly possible,' " Miller v. French , 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) 
(quoting Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 
762 (1988)), buttresses the statutory interpretation I offer. 
Finally, on a practical level, I note that requiring drug type 
and quantity to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt would not cause problems in the prosecution and 
trial processes; indeed, in the wake of Apprendi , federal 
courts throughout the nation are easily accommodating this 
requirement. Nor, as I will explain below, would it require 
overturning large numbers of convictions. 
 
I. Congress's Intent 
 
A. Legislative History 
 
In support of our prior conclusion that drug type was not 
an element of a S 841 offense, this court has noted that 
"[w]hile Congress could have enacted separate statutes 
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criminalizing the distribution of particular controlled 
substances, it did not do so." United States v. Lewis, 113 
F.3d 487, 491 (3d Cir. 1997). Similarly, at least one federal 
appellate judge has concluded that drug type and quantity 
are not elements because "[i]t is simply not credible to hold 
that Congress knowingly and intentionally fashioned some 
350 offenses in section 841." United States v. Promise, 255 
F.3d 150, 175 (4th Cir. 2001) (Luttig, J., concurring in the 
judgment). The legislative history of S 841, however, points 
to the opposite conclusion. 
 
Congress enacted the original version of S 841 as part of 
the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, S 401, 84 Stat. 1242, 1260-62. In doing so, 
Congress's intent was to unify in a single statute what was 
at that time a "plethora of legislation" creating drug 
offenses in diverse public health and revenue acts. H. R. 
Rep. No. 91-1444, in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4571; see 
also 116 Cong. Rec. 33,299-300 (1970) (statement of Rep. 
Springer) (describing the CSA as "a comprehensive 
approach" to the "big[ ] problem" of "many drug laws which 
have come about under different circumstances and with 
entirely separate and diverse histories"); id. at 33,304 
(statement of Rep. Rogers) (explaining how the CSA"would 
consolidate all of the Federal drug laws into one act . . . to 
enable more efficient administration of the laws"). 
Recognizing that enacting separate statutes for each type of 
drug would have been a needless legislative burden, 
Congress opted for the more efficient double-axis 
prosecution scheme, under which each act in violation of 
what is now S 841(a) (manufacture, distribute, etc.) could 
be prosecuted with respect to the different drug types. See, 
e.g., United States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1156 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that, at least for the purposes of double 
jeopardy, "Congress intended the possession of each 
scheduled substance to be a separate offense"). 
 
Congress first included drug quantity as an operative fact 
in determining penalties for marijuana manufacture and 
distribution in its 1980 amendments to the CSA. See Infant 
Formula Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-359, S 8(c)(2), 94 Stat. 
1190, 1194. Both the House and Senate Reports reflect 
that Congress intended quantity to function as an element 
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with respect to marijuana offenses; they state,"Individuals 
convicted of trafficking in over 1,000 pounds would be 
subject to a maximum 15 year prison sentence and/or a 
maximum $125,000 fine." H. R. Rep. No. 96-936, at 13 
(1980); S. Rep. No. 96-916, at 14 (1980) (emphasis added). 
As evidenced by the language used in 21 U.S.C. S 851, 
which was passed as part of the original CSA in 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-513, S 411, 84 Stat. 1269, Congress can be 
presumed to have been aware of the traditional legal 
distinction between conviction and sentencing at the time it 
adopted these quantity thresholds. See 21 U.S.C. S 851(b) 
(noting that the proceedings to establish prior convictions 
shall be undertaken by the court "after conviction but 
before pronouncement of sentence"). 
 
In 1984 Congress again amended the CSA to account for 
drug quantity for illegal substances other than marijuana. 
See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 255 (1983) (noting that, with the 
exception of marijuana, the prior CSA did not specifically 
account for drug quantity). Thus, according to the Senate 
Report, Congress created "a new subparagraph (A) under 
section 841(b)(1) that would provide, for offenses involving 
large amounts of particularly dangerous drugs, higher 
penalties than those now provided under section 841." Id. 
at 258 (emphasis added). The use of the plural "offenses" 
indicates Congress's intention to create within the single 
statute a multitude of separate crimes depending on drug 
type and quantity. 
 
The last relevant major changes to the CSA occurred in 
1986 when Congress, using the internal structure of 
subparagraph (b)(1)(A) of the 1984 amendments, created 
new subparagraphs (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) and included 
mandatory minimum sentences for offenses under those 
subparagraphs. See Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, S 1002, 100 Stat. 3207-2. 
The legislative record indicates that during its discussion of 
the proposed amendments, Congress understood that 
prosecutors would be required to introduce evidence of 
drug quantity during trial in order to obtain a conviction. 
See H. R. Rep. No. 99-845, at 12 (1986) (explaining that 
Congress had been informed by U.S. Attorneys that they 
would be able to meet the evidentiary burden for proving 
quantity to the jury). 
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Furthermore, the record reflects that Congress did not 
consider subparagraph (a) to lay out all of the elements of 
a S 841 offense; rather, Congress deemed drug type and 
quantity essential elements of a crime as specified in 
subparagraphs (b)(1)(A) & (B). The House Report, for 
instance, specifically notes that "[a] person convicted under 
those subparagraphs [(b)(1)(A) & (B)] shall not be eligible for 
parole until the individual has served the minimum 
sentences required by such subparagraphs." Id. at 19 
(emphasis added). Again, as noted above, Congress can be 
presumed to have been aware of the traditional legal 
distinction between conviction and sentencing. If Congress 
had intended for the drug types and quantities listed in 
S 841(b)(1)(A) & (B) to be sentencing factors, the 
accompanying legislative record would have referred to a 
person sentenced -- rather than convicted-- under those 
subparagraphs. 
 
Immediately following the 1986 amendments, the Justice 
Department itself, which had been consulted by Congress 
throughout the amendment process, see H. R. Rep. No. 99- 
845, at 12 (1986), seemed to conclude that drug type and 
quantity were elements of separate offenses defined in 
S 841(b). See Handbook on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986, at 20-21 (Dep't of Justice Mar. 1987) ("1986 
Handbook"). Notably, the 1986 Handbook repeatedly 
referred to "convictions" under the subparagraphs of 
S 841(b)(1), which lay out the penalties for the different 
drug types and quantities. Id. at 3-4, 6-7. Most importantly, 
the Department "recommend[ed] that where the enhanced 
and mandatory minimum penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. 
SS 841(b)(1) and 960(b), as amended, are based on the kind 
and quantity of drug involved in particular offenses . . . both 
the kind and the quantity of the drug be specified in the 
indictment and proven at trial." Id. at 20 (third emphasis 
added). I acknowledge that the Department only 
"recommend[ed]" such an approach, and that it later 
retreated from this position. See, e.g., United States v. 
Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1989). But the fact that it 
expressed this view in its initial "bible" on the critical 1986 
drug law, obviously written after high-level deliberations 
and at a time when vision was not clouded by subsequent 
events and perceptions, seems to me very persuasive. 
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In addition to what Congress did, what Congress did not 
do in adding drug type and quantity in the 1980, 1984, and 
1986 amendments is also informative. Specifically, 
Congress never expressly denoted drug type and quantity 
as sentencing factors to be determined by the judge and not 
the jury. See United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1079 
(7th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he statute [S 841] does not say who 
makes the findings or which party bears what burden of 
persuasion."). In contrast, in the aforementionedS 851, 
which covers proceedings to establish prior convictions for 
sentence-enhancement purposes, the statute expressly 
provides that "the court shall after conviction but before 
pronouncement of sentence" make its determination 
regarding prior conviction. 21 U.S.C. S 851(b) (emphasis 
added). My point is further advanced by reference to the 
now-repealed Dangerous Special Drug Offender Sentencing 
provision of the original CSA, which created sentencing 
factors. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, S 409, 84 Stat. 1242, 1266- 
69 (1970) (repealed 1984). Under that provision, prior felon 
status was to be assessed by a judge after conviction using 
a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See id. at 1267. 
 
In sum, Congress's failure to include drug type and 
quantity within its express sentence-enhancement 
provisions indicates its intent to treat these factors as 
elements of a crime. See United States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 
105, 108 (3d Cir. 1996) ("It is a canon of statutory 
construction that the inclusion of certain provisions implies 
the exclusion of others.") ("inclusio unius est exclusio 
alterius"). 
 
B. Nomenclature and Structure of the Statute 
 
In construing drug type and quantity as sentencing 
factors rather than elements, this court, as well as the 
other courts of appeals, have relied on the presence of the 
labels "Unlawful Acts" and "Penalties" preceding 
subsections (a) and (b) of the statute. See, e.g., United 
States v. Lewis, 113 F.3d 487, 490-91 (3d Cir. 1997). This 
approach is deeply flawed. Although one of our sister courts 
has noted that this approach "took Congress at its caption," 
Brough, 243 F.3d at 1079, a close examination reveals that 
the caption was never really Congress's at all. The original 
version of the CSA passed by Congress and signed by the 
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President did not affix the label "Unlawful Acts" to S 841(a) 
or "Penalties" to S 841(b). See CSA, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 1260-62) 1466-68. Nor were 
these captions added in any of the subsequent 
amendments to the CSA. Rather, these section headings 
can be traced to the Office of the Federal Register, National 
Archives and Records Services, which added a reference to 
"penalties" as a margin note to the predecessor of S 841(b) 
in the Statutes at Large simply for user convenience. 84 
Stat. 1261 (1970). Unfortunately, when the CSA was 
reproduced in the United States Code, the margin notes 
were converted into subsection headings by the codification 
committee, but have never been officially adopted by the 
Congress, and, therefore, do not have the force of law. See 
U.S.C. at vii (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting that Title 21 
has never been officially codified). 
 
Even if the subsection titles had been officially adopted 
by Congress, we would be wrong to ascribe to subsection 
(b)'s "Penalties" label the talismanic power to indicate that 
drug type and quantity are sentencing factors rather than 
elements of separate crimes. See Castillo v. United States, 
530 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (noting that the mere fact that a 
statutory section is entitled "Penalties" does not indicate 
whether that section creates sentencing factors or entirely 
new crimes for "[t]he title alone does not tell us which are 
which"). Although S 841(a) is entitled"Unlawful Acts," this 
subsection alone does not define a complete offense 
because it includes no punishment. A jury verdict finding 
only that the defendant had committed the acts described 
in subsection (a), without more, would not render the 
defendant guilty of a crime requiring any ascertainable 
punishment. Compare Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
523 U.S. 224 (1998) (construing 8 U.S.C. S 1326(b)(2) as a 
sentencing factor where an earlier portion of the statute -- 
S 1326(a) -- already provided for specific penalties), with 
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (construing the 
provisions of 18 U.S.C. S 2119(2)-(3) as elements where the 
prefatory statutory text did not provide for penalties but 
only described prohibited conduct). 
 
Furthermore, the wide variation in penalties for the 
manufacture and distribution of different combinations of 
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drug type and quantity counsels in favor of construing 
these factors as elements. In two recent cases, Jones and 
Castillo, the Supreme Court observed that the degree to 
which the commission of a proscribed act increases the 
maximum penalty reflects Congress's intent to make the 
particular act an element or a sentencing factor. In Castillo, 
the Government argued that under 18 U.S.C. S 924(c), 
which prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm in relation 
to a crime of violence, the particular type of firearm used by 
the defendant was a sentencing factor for the judge to 
determine. In rejecting this argument, the Court deemed it 
important that the mandatory penalty for using or carrying 
a machinegun was "six times more severe" than the penalty 
for using or carrying a mere "firearm," such as a pistol, 
thereby demonstrating Congress's intent to make each of 
these a "separate crime." 530 U.S. at 127. 
 
Likewise, in Jones, the Court considered"serious bodily 
injury" an element of the crime of carjacking rather than a 
sentencing factor under 18 U.S.C. S 2119 in large part 
because it increased the authorized penalty by two-thirds. 
526 U.S. at 243. The Court worried that leaving such 
consequential determinations to a judge rather than the 
jury would relegate the jury to the role of "low-level 
gatekeeping," resulting in "the erosion of the jury's 
function." Id. at 244. Such a diminution of the jury's role, 
the Court cautioned in language foreshadowing Apprendi, 
"would merit Sixth Amendment concern." Id.  at 248.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), a case 
that preceded Jones and Castillo, the Supreme Court construed a 
provision of immigration law that increased the maximum prison term 
for a deported alien who has illegally reentered the country from two to 
twenty years if his initial deportation was subsequent to an aggravated 
felony conviction. Despite the tenfold increase in maximum prison time, 
the Court construed the provision as a sentencing factor rather than an 
element in large part because recidivism "is a traditional, if not the 
most 
traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's 
sentence." Id. at 243. The Court again limited the breadth of this holding 
a year later in Jones when it noted that Almendarez-Torres "rested in 
substantial part on the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing 
factor, not as an element. . . ." 526 U.S. at 249. The Court's refusal to 
consider prior conviction an element in Almendarez-Torres despite the 
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Applying the lessons of Castillo and Jones, it seems clear 
to me that S 841 establishes multiple offenses based on the 
elements of drug type and quantity. The maximum 
penalties authorized by the statute vary greatly depending 
on type and quantity of the controlled substance. For 
example, assuming no prior convictions, the maximum 
penalty for the distribution of a schedule V substance of 
any quantity is one year, see S 841(b)(3), while the 
maximum penalty for the distribution of more than 500 
grams of cocaine not resulting in any death or serious 
bodily injury is forty years. See S 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II). Even 
within the same drug type, penalties can vary significantly 
by quantity alone. Compare, e.g., S 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) 
(providing a maximum of forty years imprisonment for a 
violation of subsection (a) involving "100 kilograms or more 
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 
of marijuana" for a defendant with no prior convictions), 
with S 841(b)(1)(D) (providing a maximum of five years 
imprisonment "[i]n the case of less than 50 kilograms of 
marihuana [sic]" for a defendant with no prior convictions). 
I believe that these dramatic differences in the severity of 
punishment further signal Congress's intent to make drug 
type and quantity elements of the several offenses 
established under S 841. 
 
II. Constitutional Doubt 
 
Undergirding my interpretation of S 841 is the time- 
honored maxim that "constitutionally doubtful 
constructions should be avoided where `fairly possible.' " 
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) (quoting 
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 
(1988)). To be sure, a statutory construction ofS 841 that 
requires proving drug type and/or quantity to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt only when either factor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
tenfold increase in penalty, therefore, ought not to be considered in 
tension with its approach to statutory construction in Jones and Castillo, 
for, as the Court subsequently made clear in Apprendi, sentence 
enhancements for prior conviction are sui generis. See Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 490 (announcing the Apprendi rule as applying to "any fact that 
increases the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" except 
"the fact of a prior conviction"). 
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increases the maximum statutory penalty avoids 
constitutional doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Brough, 243 
F.3d 1078, 1080 (7th Cir. 2001). In choosing between that 
construction and the one offered here, however, we ought to 
be guided by a realistic appraisal of Congress's intent, for 
although it is our duty to "strain to construe legislation so 
as to save it against constitutional attack," we"must not 
and will not carry this to the point of perverting the 
purpose of a statute . . .' or judicially rewriting it." Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoting 
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)). 
 
Although I believe that the legislative history and 
statutory structure indicate that drug type and quantity are 
elements of a S 841 offense, it is possible that Congress 
intended them to be sentencing factors for the judge to 
determine. See United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157, 
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17867 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001) (re- 
affirming, despite Apprendi, an earlier holding finding drug 
type and quantity always to be sentencing factors for the 
judge to determine, thereby rendering S 841 
unconstitutional). It strains credulity, however, to assert 
that Congress intended for type and quantity to be treated 
as sentencing factors in some cases and as elements in 
others. I know of no statute written in such a manner, nor 
am I aware of any statutes construed this way. See also 
Promise, 255 F.3d at 185 (Luttig, J., concurring in the 
judgment) ("Either facts that affect the sentence a 
defendant receives are elements or they are not; they are 
not elements for some purposes and not for others."). 
 
Furthermore, in this case we cannot assume that 
Congress might have adopted such an unusual approach 
simply to avoid an Apprendi violation. See Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (explaining that the canon of 
constitutional doubt "is followed out of respect for 
Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of 
constitutional limitations"). Congress enacted the most 
recent relevant structural changes to S 841 in 1986; the 
Supreme Court issued its Apprendi decision just last year. 
Indeed, Congress has not amended S 841 at all since the 
Apprendi decision. The constitutional limitation of Apprendi 
perforce did not exist at any time at which Congress wrote 
 
                                32 
 
 
or re-wrote S 841. Although we can never be entirely certain 
of what Congress did intend in draftingS 841, we can be 
sure that Congress did not intend to designS 841 to fit 
precisely within the contours of a constitutional rule that 
did not yet exist. It is much more likely that Congress 
intended for drug type and quantity always to be elements 
of a S 841 offense. I would, therefore, overrule our prior 
cases -- e.g., United States v. Lewis, 113 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 
1997); United States v. Chapple, 985 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 
1993); United States v. Gibbs, 813 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1987) 




While the foregoing discussion explicates my position, it 
is necessary that I respond to the suggestion that"the sky 
will fall" if my interpretation prevails. Requiring the 
prosecution to prove drug type and quantity to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt will not needlessly complicate 
the trial process. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 157 n.6 ("It will 
not be unduly difficult for juries to determine whether an 
offense involved a specific threshold drug quantity."). Since 
Apprendi, federal district courts have proceeded in this 
manner, submitting special interrogatories to the jury for 
determination of drug type and quantity, and many have 
been operating in this manner since Jones. In the Appendix 
to this opinion I attach an example of a special 
interrogatory on drug quantity prepared by the Office of the 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and used without incident or problem by the 
judges of the district court since Jones. Furthermore, in 
some state systems, juries have been routinely performing 
this function for at least five years. See Promise, 255 F.3d 
at 157 n.6 (citing State v. Virgo, 947 P.2d 923, 926 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1997); State v. Moore, 698 A.2d 1259, 1264 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)). 
 
Nor will requiring drug type and quantity to be proved to 
the jury unduly burden the defendant. Justice Breyer and 
others have objected to the interpretation I offer because it 
"could easily place the defendant in the awkward (and 
conceivably unfair) position of having to deny he committed 
the crime yet offer proof about how he committed it, e.g., `I 
did not sell drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams.' " 
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 17867, at *29-30 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001) (quoting 
same). However, if drug quantity were classified as a 
sentencing factor for which preponderance of the evidence 
is the burden of proof, the defendant would lose the 
advantage of forcing the government to prove this oft- 
disputed fact beyond a reasonable doubt.2  
 
Even if the defendant would be advantaged by having the 
issue decided by a judge rather than a jury, as Justice 
Breyer contends, such is not the system envisioned by our 
Constitution. That system puts its faith in the fairness of a 
trial by a jury of one's peers. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]t is not arguable that, just 
because one thinks [having a judge determine the facts that 
affect the length of a sentence] is a better system, it must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Moreover, it seems to me that the kind of scenario feared by Justice 
Breyer is often intrinsic to criminal statutes in which penalties vary 
according to different elements. In Castillo, the Court concluded that the 
type of weapon used in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c), which prohibits 
the use or carrying of a "firearm" in relation to a crime of violence, was 
an element of an offense under the statute. In an opinion written by 
Justice Breyer himself, the Court noted: 
 
       [I]nasmuch as the prosecution's case underS 924(c) usually will 
       involve presenting a certain weapon (or weapons) to the jury and 
       arguing that the defendant used or carried that weapon during a 
       crime of violence within the meaning of the statute, the evidence 
is 
       unlikely to enable a defendant to respond both  (1) "I did not use 
or 
       carry any firearm," and (2) "even if I did, it was a pistol, not a 
       machinegun." 
 
530 U.S. at 128. I fail to see any principled distinction between S 924(c) 
and the position in which the defendant would be placed under my 
interpretation of S 841. In either case, the defendant might be forced, as 
a matter of trial strategy, to choose between denying the commission of 
the crime outright and admitting a lesser amount of wrongdoing in order 
to receive a shorter sentence. Perhaps Justice Breyer's distinction is 
that 
under S 924(c), the prosecution will present to the jury a tangible, 
discrete object -- the weapon -- whereas in the drug context, the 
prosecution will present only a plastic bag of powder or pills, whose type 
and quantity may not be readily apparent to the jury. Such a distinction, 
I submit, is too slender a reed upon which to hinge the determination of 
element or sentencing factor. 
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be, or is even more likely to be, the system envisioned by a 
Constitution that guarantees trial by jury."). 
 
Additionally, I do not believe that my construction of 
S 841 will result in the overturning of the myriad 
convictions obtained where drug type and/or quantity were 
not proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby 
imposing huge burdens on the court system. Any appeal 
from such a conviction is likely to be reviewed under the 
plain error standard. Evidenced by the decision of this 
court today, plain error analysis will rarely result in the 
overturning of a conviction. Most of the other courts of 
appeals engaging in plain error review have similarly 
declined to exercise their discretion to reverse convictions 
that have violated Apprendi by not proving drug type and 
quantity to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See cases 
cited in opinion of the Court, ante, at 20 nn.14-18. Even 
under the harmless error standard, the evidence of drug 
quantity adduced at trial, as the cases I have seen in the 
last decade suggest, is usually so overwhelming as to have 
not affected the defendant's substantial rights. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lawson, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18153, at 




Construing S 841 in the manner explained, I nonetheless 
join the judgment of the Court because I believe, as set 
forth in Section II.B of the Court's opinion, that the failure 
to submit drug quantity to the jury did not affect Vazquez's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In this case, the indictment alleged drug type and quantity, so 
Vazquez cannot (and does not) raise the argument that the failure to 
allege drug type and quantity in the indictment raises different issues on 
review than failure to prove these factors to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(noticing plain error where drug quantity was not included in the 
indictment for a S 841 offense because "the district court lacks the 
jurisdiction to impose a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum of 
the offense alleged in the indictment"); cf. also United States v. Tran, 
234 
F.3d 798, 809 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing conviction where the indictment 
failed to allege "all of the material elements of an offense" without 
requiring any showing of prejudice by the defendant because the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to convict the defendant of an offense not 
properly charged). 
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substantial rights and that, even if it did, it did not 
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings. 
 





8. Drug case special interrogatories and verdict form re 
       quantity 
 






Jury Interrogatory Number One -- Count 1 (Conspiracy) 
 
If you find the defendant guilty of the conspiracy charged 
in Count 1, please answer the following question: 
 
-- Do you unanimously agree, by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the quantity of cocaine base 
("crack") which was distributed and/or intended to be 
distributed as part of the conspiracy was 50 grams or 
more? 
 
       _______ Yes 
 
       _______ No 
 
If your answer to this question is "yes," that concludes 
Jury Interrogatory Number One. Do not go on to the next 
question on this page. Proceed to Count 2 of this verdict 
form. 
 
If your answer to this question is "no," please answer the 
following question: 
 
-- Do you unanimously agree, by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the quantity of cocaine base 
("crack") which was distributed and/or intended to be 
distributed as part of the conspiracy was five (5) grams or 
more? 
 
       _______ Yes 
 
       _______ No 
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___________________ Not Guilty 
 
Jury Interrogatory Number Two -- Count 2 (Distribution) 
 
If you find the defendant guilty of the distribution 
charged in Count 2, please answer the following question: 
 
-- Do you unanimously agree, by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the quantity of cocaine base 
("crack") which was distributed was 50 grams or more? 
 
       _______ Yes 
 
       _______ No 
 
If your answer to this question is "yes," that concludes 
Jury Interrogatory Number Two. Do not go on to the next 
question on this page. 
 
If your answer to this question is "no," please answer the 
following question: 
 
-- Do you unanimously agree, by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the quantity of cocaine base 
("crack") which was distributed was five (5) grams or more? 
 
       _______ Yes 
 
       _______ No 
 
       JURY FOREPERSON 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Judges 
Mansmann, Nygaard, and McKee join, and with whom 
Judges Roth and Rendell join as to Part I. 
 
The majority's opinion is based on the following logic: 
Vazquez was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to 
possess and distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 846 and 841 respectively; the jury 
was instructed to find whether Vazquez conspired to 
possess and distribute cocaine but was not instructed to 
find the quantity of cocaine involved; following the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), a jury is required to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to 
which the defendant is exposed by the jury's verdict; in this 
case the jury's verdict exposed Vazquez to sentencing under 
S 841(b)(1)(C) for which the maximum penalty is 20 years 
(240 months) imprisonment; the trial judge, applying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, determined that 
Vazquez had been involved with 992 grams of powder 
cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine and therefore 
sentenced Vazquez to 292 months imprisonment; this 
constituted a violation of Apprendi, but the court will affirm 
because Vazquez didn't contest the amount of drugs at 
trial, and the court is confident that the jury would have 
made the same determination that the trial judge made, so 
the Apprendi violation was not plain error. 
 
There are many bases on which one might take issue 
with the logic of the majority's opinion, but I begin by 
approaching the majority's opinion on its own terms. That 
requires consideration of whether the Apprendi  violation 






The Apprendi Decision 
 
Apprendi, who had fired several shots into the home of 
an African-American family, was charged in state court 
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with, inter alia, two counts of second-degree possession of 
a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of third- 
degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb. 
Under New Jersey law, a second-degree offense carries a 
penalty range of 5 to 10 years of imprisonment. After 
Apprendi pleaded guilty to these counts pursuant to a plea 
agreement, the prosecutor, as permitted by that agreement, 
filed a motion to enhance Apprendi's sentence under New 
Jersey's hate crime statute which authorized an enhanced 
sentence upon the finding of a trial judge, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant 
committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person 
or group because of race. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:44-3(e) 
(West Supp. 1999-2000). Based on Apprendi's own 
statements made after his arrest, the trial court found that 
the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced him to 
12 years of imprisonment. Apprendi appealed his sentence 
through the New Jersey courts, contending that the Due 
Process Clause requires that racial bias be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but they upheld the enhanced 
sentence. 
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. In reaching 
its conclusion, the Court noted among the "constitutional 
protections of surpassing importance" the provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that liberty can be deprived only 
with due process and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a 
trial by jury, which entitle the defendant to a jury 
determination that s/he is guilty of every element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
476. The Court cited to its earlier decision in In re Winship, 
where it stated: "the Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged." Id. at 477 (quoting In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)) (brackets omitted). 
 
The Apprendi Court examined the historical 
underpinnings of these principles and, while recognizing 
that discretion had been accorded to trial judges in their 
sentencing decisions, reasoned that such discretion cannot 
deprive a defendant at the time of sentencing "of 
protections that have, until that point, unquestionably 
attached." Id. at 484. 
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Finding that the New Jersey statutory scheme under 
which a judge may enhance the punishment based on a 
finding by a preponderance of the evidence violated due 
process, the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id. at 490. In doing so, the Court rejected New 
Jersey's argument that racial bias was only a sentencing 
factor and not an element of the crime, stating:"the 
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-- does the 
required finding expose the defendant to a greater 
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty 






The count of the Superseding Indictment on which 
Vazquez was tried and found guilty, and which is at issue 
here, charges him with conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute, and to distribute, more than 5 kilos of cocaine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841, and, following the setting forth 
of 10 paragraphs constituting the Overt Acts, states, "All in 
violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 846." 
 
Section 841(a) is entitled "Unlawful acts" and provides 
that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally -- (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, 
or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance." Section 841(a) does not 
prescribe penalties. It is S 841(b), entitled"Penalties," that 
prescribes the range of penalties for certain quantities of 
controlled substances. Under S 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), the sentence 
for a defendant convicted of violating S 841(a) with 50 
grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base (i.e., 
crack cocaine) is not less than 10 years of imprisonment 
and no more than life. The sentence under S 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) 
for a defendant with 5 grams or more of a mixture 
containing cocaine base is not less than 5 years and not 
more than 40 years of imprisonment. Section 841(b)(1)(C), 
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often referred to as the catch all provision, contains no 
drug quantity requirement and provides a maximum 
possible sentence of 20 years of imprisonment. 
The majority concedes that S 841(b)(1)(C) "defines 
Vazquez's prescribed statutory maximum sentence as 20 
years." Maj. Op. at 8. The majority then states:"The 
Apprendi violation occurred when the judge, rather than 
the jury, determined drug quantity and then sentenced 
Vazquez to a more than 24-year sentence." Maj. Op. at 8. 
Surprisingly, it does not remand so that Vazquez can be 
resentenced to a sentence that does not exceed the 
maximum authorized by the statute. Instead, it devises a 
rationale to affirm the sentence that was arrived at in an 
unconstitutional manner. 
 
I do not understand why the majority's disposition is 
appropriate, necessary, or just. I note that in Apprendi, the 
Supreme Court, after finding that the procedure that led 
to the enhancement of Apprendi's sentence was 
unconstitutional, reversed and remanded. Of course, 
Apprendi came to the Court from the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, not from a federal court, but I see no justification in 
Apprendi itself for us to do anything different with a District 
Court judgment. 
 
The majority, however, after noting that Vazquez did not 
challenge the evidence of drug quantity or object to the 
court's failure to submit the issue to the jury, 1 sustains the 
sentence that was unconstitutionally enhanced by applying 
the plain error standard. Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because Apprendi was decided after Vazquez's conviction and 
sentence, it is understandable that Vazquez did not timely object in the 
District Court either before or after the instruction on the ground that 
drug quantity should be submitted to the jury. In United States v. Nance, 
236 F.3d 820, 823-24 (7th Cir. 2000), the court considering a similar 
question stated that because of earlier indications, primarily the opinion 
of the Supreme Court in Jones v. United States , 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the 
defendant could have argued that the quantity of the drugs should have 
been charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As a result, the court concluded it would review for plain error. Nance, 
236 F.3d at 825. In light of the position I take, I need not consider 
whether the Jones decision provided a sufficient basis to forewarn 
criminal defendants that an objection was called for. 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[p]lain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they 
were not brought to the attention of the court." In United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the Supreme Court 
explained that there must be (1) "error," (2) that is "plain," 
and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights." Id. at 732 
(quotation marks omitted). The appellate court will then 
have discretion to correct such an error if it (4)"seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings." Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
The majority agrees that in sentencing Vazquez, the court 
committed error and that it was plain. It concludes that the 
error was harmless because Vazquez cannot show that the 
error affected his substantial rights. The majority bases 
that conclusion on its determination that the evidence 
established that Vazquez sold more than 5 grams, which is 
sufficient to carry a statutory maximum penalty under 21 
U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) of 40 years imprisonment, more 
than the 24 plus years to which he was sentenced. The 
majority states that based on its consideration of the 
evidence "we can say without a doubt that Vazquez 
conspired to possess and/or distribute the 992 grams of 
powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine the 
authorities found at the Columbia rooming house." Maj. 
Op. at 16. Therefore, the majority concludes that the 
Apprendi error did not affect Vazquez's substantial rights. 
 
Completing its plain error inquiry, the majority holds that 
even if the Apprendi violation affected Vazquez's substantial 
rights, he cannot establish the fourth factor, i.e., that the 
error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. The majority so holds 
because, it says, Vazquez was the leader of a drug 
trafficking operation that distributed cocaine in Lancaster 
County, and a rational jury would certainly have found that 
he conspired to possess and distribute more than the 
amount necessary to support a "slightly more than 24-year 
sentence pursuant to S 841(b)(1)(B)'s 5-to-40-year 
sentencing range." Maj. Op. at 19. 
 





The Substantial Rights Inquiry 
 
I agree with the majority that there was error in 
sentencing Vazquez and that it was plain. I disagree that 
the error did not affect Vazquez's substantial rights. Under 
the plain error inquiry, "the error must have been 
prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. It is the 
defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. See id. 
Vazquez's sentence to more than 24 years imprisonment, 
which exceeds the statutory maximum of 20 years 
imprisonment under S 841(b)(1)(C) authorized by the jury 
verdict, clearly affects Vazquez's substantial rights. An error 
that will cause a defendant to spend four plus years more 
in prison than statutorily authorized by the jury's verdict 
necessarily adversely affects the defendant's substantial 
rights. 
 
I find it curious that the majority never acknowledges 
that additional time in prison could affect substantial 
rights. In other contexts, courts of appeals have not 
hesitated to conclude that an error resulting in an increase 
in the defendant's sentence affected the defendant's 
substantial rights. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 201 
F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) ("An error that results in 
a longer sentence undoubtedly affects substantial rights."); 
United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 676 (2d Cir. 
1998) (finding clerical error which increased defendant's 
sentence by several months to affect substantial rights). 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held in Glover v. United 
States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001), that an increase in a 
defendant's sentence of at least six months was prejudicial 
in relation to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Of 
relevance here, the Court noted that "any amount of actual 
jail time has Sixth Amendment significance." Glover, 531 
U.S. at 203; see also United States v. Knight , No. 99-5642 
(3d Cir. Sept. 6, 2001) (holding application of an incorrect 
sentencing guideline range affected substantial rights and 
was plain error even though sentence was also within 
correct range). 
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In Apprendi violation cases, numerous courts have 
recognized that extra prison time affects substantial rights. 
In United States v. Nordby, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
"[f]ive additional years of imprisonment were imposed 
beyond that authorized by this verdict, which easily affected 
[defendant's] substantial rights." 225 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th 
Cir. 2000). It reiterated that holding the following year in 
United States v. Buckland, 2001 WL 893440, *9, reh'g en 
banc granted, 2001 WL 1091167 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Imposing 
a sentence that is seven years more than the maximum 
sentence constitutionally permitted under the facts as 
found by the jury undoubtedly `seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.' "). Morever, the Tenth Circuit in United States 
v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000), recognized that it 
"regularly has found reversible error when the sentence 
imposed by the district court exceeded the statutory 
maximum penalty applicable to the offense of conviction." 
Id. at 1238. Even courts that did not ultimately reverse on 
the basis of an Apprendi error have recognized that prison 
sentences in excess of the applicable maximum affect 
substantial rights. See United States v. Promise , 255 F.3d 
150, 150, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. 
Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir. 2001) (assuming that 
Apprendi error that increased defendant's sentence by over 
7 years affected his substantial rights); Nance , 236 F.3d at 
825-26 (same).2 
 
Because the majority opinion would leave intact a 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum that was not 
based on a jury finding under the beyond-a-reasonable- 
doubt standard, thereby ignoring established constitutional 
principles, I cannot see how the effect could be other than 
to impugn the "fairness, integrity and public reputation" of 
the judicial process. The fact that the majority condones a 
process by which a judge usurped a determination within 
the jury's province strikes at the reputation of the judicial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In affirming the sentences, these courts shifted the inquiry from the 
effect on substantial rights to the discretionary question referred to in 
Olano, which was whether the error was one that"seriously affect[ed] the 
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proceedings here. Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J. 
concurring) ("Judges, it is sometimes necessary to remind 
ourselves, are part of the State . . . . The founders of the 
American Republic were not prepared to leave [criminal 
justice] to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee 
was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has always been 
free.") (parenthesis omitted). 
 
In determining that Vazquez's substantial rights were not 
affected, the majority relies on the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), 
and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), where the 
Court held that erroneous jury instructions did not require 
reversal. However, the substantial rights inquiry in those 
cases was not the same as it is here. 
 
In Johnson, the trial judge had instructed the jury that 
the materiality of the statements was an issue for the judge 
and not the jury to decide, and the defendant did not object 
to this instruction. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 463. After 
Johnson's conviction, the Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), which held that the 
materiality of a false statement must be decided by a jury. 
Johnson, 520 U.S. at 463. The Supreme Court held that 
Johnson had not established the fourth prong of the plain 
error standard -- that the error seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. In so holding, the Court noted that the 
evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming and that 
the defendant presented no plausible argument that her 
false statements under oath were not material. See id. at 
470. 
 
In Neder, the error was similar, i.e., the trial court's 
failure to charge the jury on the materiality of the false 
statements or omissions for which the defendant was 
convicted. The defendant in Neder had objected to the 
instruction, so the Court's discussion on prejudice was in 
the context of a harmless error analysis. See  527 U.S. at 6- 
7, 15. The Court held there was overwhelming evidence of 
the materiality of the statements, and hence the omission 
of the charge was harmless error. See id. at 16-20. 
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In neither case was the sentence at issue; rather the 
issue was whether to uphold or reverse the jury's verdict of 
guilt. Here, we must decide whether an increase in prison 
time as a result of the error affects the defendant's 
substantial rights. As a result, those cases are inapposite 
here. 
 
Instead of affirming the sentence on the ground that 
Vazquez's substantial rights were not affected, as the 
majority does, I would follow the disposition recently 
reached by some of our sister circuits who, after finding an 
Apprendi error in sentencing the defendant, vacated the 
sentence and remanded for resentencing within the 
statutory maximum sentence authorized by the jury 
verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez , 253 F.3d 251, 
255-56 (6th Cir. 2001) (vacating the defendants' sentences 
and remanding for resentencing because the sentences 
exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by the jury 
verdict by 12 and 15 years respectively); United States v. 
Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 2001) (remanding for 
resentencing because the defendant's 97 month sentence of 
imprisonment exceeded the statutory maximum of 60 
months); United States v. Velazquez, 246 F.3d 204, 218-19 
(2d Cir. 2001) (vacating the defendant's sentence and 
remanding for sentencing because the sentence exceeded 
by four months the maximum that could be imposed 
without a jury determination of an element of the crime); 
United States v. McWaine, 243 F.3d 871, 875-76 (5th Cir. 
2001) (vacating the sentence and remanding for 
resentencing because the defendant's life sentence exceeded 
the 20-year statutory maximum sentence authorized by the 
jury); United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (remanding for resentencing because the actual 
sentence of 30 years exceeded the 20-year statutory 
maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict); United 
States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(remanding for resentencing because "[f]ive additional years 
of imprisonment were imposed beyond that authorized by 
this verdict, which easily affected [defendant's] substantial 
rights."). Although not every court that has found an 
Apprendi violation followed the course of these cases, I 
believe that course is the one demanded by justice. 
 





In reaching its conclusion to affirm Vazquez's sentence, 
the majority rejects Vazquez's argument that the Apprendi 
error was a structural defect. Structural defects are per se 
prejudicial and pretermit the substantial rights inquiry. 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). The 
majority reasons that "Apprendi violations result in both 
trial and sentencing errors, albeit ones that rise to a 
constitutional dimension," Maj. Op. at 15; that the 
Supreme Court has instructed that most constitutional 
errors can be harmless; that both trial errors and 
sentencing errors have been subjected to harmless or plain 
error analysis; and that therefore "an Apprendi violation is 
not a structural defect." Maj. Op. at 15. 
 
I believe the majority's syllogism is flawed and that the 
issue of an Apprendi violation as a structural defect merits 
more analysis than has been given to it in the cases, 
including even those cases that have reversed sentences 
imposed in violation of Apprendi and remanded for 
resentencing. 
 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), even 
though the Court held that constitutional errors could be 
harmless, it also recognized that there are some 
constitutional errors that are not subject to harmless error 
analysis. Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to them in 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), as involving 
rights "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never 
be treated as harmless error." Id. at 308 (quoting Chapman, 
386 U.S. at 23). Structural defects occur in a limited class 
of cases, such as where there has been a complete denial 
of counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
a biased trial judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
(1927), unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's 
race, see Vazquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), denial of 
self-representation, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 
(1984), denial of public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 
39 (1984), or a defective reasonable-doubt instruction to 
the jury, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
Such errors have been termed "structural" because each 
involves a "defect affecting the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial 
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process itself." Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 (quoting Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). 
 
Perhaps the Sullivan case best illustrates a structural 
error. As explained in Justice Scalia's opinion for a 
unanimous Court, a constitutionally defective reasonable- 
doubt instruction violated the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury, a right that is " `fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice.' " 508 U.S. at 277 (quoting Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
 
Sullivan was convicted by a jury following a charge that 
defined a reasonable doubt in terms of "a grave 
uncertainty," a definition that did not meet constitutional 
standards. Justice Scalia began his discussion why such 
an error was not amenable to harmless-error analysis with 
the principle that the most important element in the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury is "the right to have the 
jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of 
`guilty.' " Id. He continued, "although a judge may direct a 
verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally 
insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for 
the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
Having established the constitutional principle, he then 
considered whether the Court could uphold the jury verdict 
on the basis of harmless error, stating that "[h]armless- 
error review looks . . . to the basis on which `the jury 
actually rested its verdict.' " Id.  at 279 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991)). 
The inquiry "is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, 
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial 
was surely unattributable to the error." Id.  "That must be 
so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never 
in fact rendered -- no matter how inescapable the findings 
to support that verdict might be -- would violate the jury- 
trial guarantee." Id. 
 
It appears that the majority in this case rejects the 
possibility that the Apprendi violation was a structural 
defect by reliance on the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Johnson and Neder. Johnson had argued that the error, the 
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failure to instruct the jury that it must decide the 
materiality of the false statements, was a structural defect 
and therefore outside the scope of Rule 52(b). The Johnson 
Court stated that "[i]t is by no means clear" whether the 
failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury was 
a structural error. 520 U.S. at 469. It continued,"Sullivan 
v. Louisiana, the case most closely on point, held that the 
erroneous definition of `reasonable doubt' vitiated all of the 
jury's findings because one could only speculate what a 
properly charged jury might have done." Id.  The Court then 
noted that the failure to submit materiality to the jury "can 
just as easily be analogized to improperly instructing the 
jury on an element of the offense, an error which is subject 
to harmless-error analysis, as it can be to failing to give a 
proper reasonable-doubt instruction altogether." Id. 
(citations omitted). The Court did not resolve this question 
because it affirmed the conviction notwithstanding the error 
on the ground that Johnson had not established the fourth 
prong of the plain error standard. Id. at 469-70. 
 
In Neder, the Court undertook the analysis of structural 
defects it avoided in Johnson. The Court considered and 
rejected the defendant's argument that the error-- the trial 
court's omission of an element of the offense from the jury 
instruction -- was a structural defect. 527 U.S. at 8-15. 
The Court reviewed the numerous cases in which it held 
that various trial errors were not structural defects. Among 
those were cases dealing with improperly instructing the 
jury on an element of the offense, see California v. Roy, 
519 U.S. 2 (1996), erroneous mandatory conclusive 
presumptions, see Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 
(1989), and erroneous mandatory rebuttable presumptions, 
see Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991). Similarly, it noted 
that the Court had previously held that harmless-error 
analysis applies to the erroneous admission of evidence in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self- 
incrimination, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 
(1991), and the erroneous exclusion of evidence in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, see 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
 
The error in Neder's case was not a structural defect 
because it "[did] not necessarily render a criminal trial 
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fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for 
determining guilt or innocence." Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 
(emphasis omitted). That is, "where a reviewing court 
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted 
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming 
evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the 
same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly 
found to be harmless." Id. at 17. 
 
Therefore, if the majority is correct that the error here 
was the failure to submit an element of the offense to the 
jury, then there would be no basis to argue that the error 
in this case was a structural defect. However, I believe that 
an Apprendi error is an error of a different dimension. 
There were at least two constitutional violations identified 
in Apprendi. One dealt with the issue of the respective roles 
of the jury and judge. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477. The 
other dealt with the standard of proof, the requirement that 
the government prove a criminal defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See id. at 478. It is arguable that after 
Neder, a trial error that enables a judge, rather than a jury, 
to determine one of the elements of the offense is not a 
structural defect, although Justice Scalia's dissent in Neder 
persuades me (albeit not a majority of the Court) that it 
should be so regarded. 
 
In his Neder opinion, Justice Scalia characterized 
Johnson as standing "for the proposition that, just as the 
absolute right to trial by jury can be waived, so also the 
failure to object to its deprivation at the point where the 
deprivation can be remedied will preclude automatic 
reversal." Neder, 527 U.S. at 35. Following Justice Scalia's 
reading of Johnson in Neder, one might argue that even if 
Vazquez waived his jury trial right by failing to contest the 
trial court's arrogation of the jury's obligation to decide 
drug quantity, an element of the crime, this case is unlike 
both Johnson and Neder because an Apprendi violation also 




3. As the Neder majority observed, appellate inquiry into "whether the 
record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding 
with respect to the omitted element . . . . `serve[s] a very useful 
purpose 
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Nothing in either Johnson or Neder, or any other case of 
which I am aware, justifies treating the failure to apply the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to drug quantity as 
anything other than a structural defect. That failure, I 
believe, is comparable to the structural defect in the 
constitutionally deficient beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
instruction found in Sullivan. The Due Process Clause, 
Sullivan explains, requires that the prosecution persuade 
the factfinder "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the facts 
necessary to establish all elements of the offense. 508 U.S. 
at 277-78. If there is no jury verdict finding petitioner guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, "[t]he most an appellate court 
can conclude is that a jury would surely have found 
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 280. 
"That," said the Court in Sullivan,"is not enough." Id. And 
further, "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires more than 
appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or 
else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on 
appeal." Id. 
 
In Apprendi, the Court discussed separately the two 
rights -- the one that requires trial by jury and"the 
companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 478. The Court 
commented, "The `demand for a higher degree of persuasion 
in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient 
times, [though] its crystallization into the formula "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" seems to have occurred as late as 
1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as 
the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must 
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.' " C. 
McCormick, Evidence S 321, pp. 681-682 (1954); see also 9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
insofar as [it] block[s] setting aside convictions for small errors or 
defects 
that have little, if any likelihood of having changed the result of the 
trial.' " Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 22 (1967)). At the conclusion of its rejection of the structural error 
claim, the Court observed: "Reversal without any consideration of the 
effect of the error upon the verdict would send the case back for retrial 
-- a retrial not focused at on the issue of materiality, but on contested 
issues on which the jury was properly instructed." Id. at 15. In Vazquez's 
case, there would be no retrial, only a remand for resentencing. 
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J. Wigmore, Evidence S 2497 (3d ed.1940)." Id. (quoting In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970)). Apprendi reaffirmed 
the pronouncement in Winship that "the`reasonable doubt' 
standard among common-law jurisdictions `reflect[s] a 
profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered.' " Id.  (quoting Winship, 
397 U.S. at 361-62) (quotation omitted). 
 
In the Supreme Court cases discussing structural 
defects, the Court consistently lists among the errors that 
it has found to be structural the defective reasonable-doubt 
instruction in Sullivan. It did so in Johnson and it did so in 
Neder. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469. 
In contrast, in Vazquez's case, the trial judge made the 
finding of drug quantity by a preponderance of the 
evidence. It is the majority that first applies the beyond-a- 
reasonable-doubt standard to drug quantity. 
 
While it is true that the jury made findings sufficient to 
sustain a S 841(b)(1)(C) verdict under a beyond-a- 
reasonable-doubt standard, it did not so find as to the 
amount of drugs under any other provision of S 841(b). It is 
this defect, which, while it did not "infect the entire trial 
process," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993), 
as most structural defects have done, infected the portion 
of the criminal proceedings at issue here, i.e., the sentence, 
and I see no reason why the same structural defect analysis 
that applies in the other cases which the Court agrees defy 
harmless-error review would not apply to the sentence. I 
believe that the majority opinion undermines, indeed 
nullifies, the long tradition in American constitutional 
criminal jurisprudence that it is the jury, rather than the 
judge, that must determine the offense for which the 
defendant has been sentenced and that it must so find 
beyond a reasonable doubt.4 I would therefore hold that we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Justice Scalia closes his Neder dissent with the following quote from 
Blackstone, 
 
       However convenient [intrusions on the jury right] may appear at 
       first, (as doubtless, all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the 
most 
       convenient,) yet let it be again remembered that delays and little 
       inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price that all free 
       nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters; 
that 
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must remand for a new sentencing hearing.5  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       these inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the nation are 
       fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and that, 
       though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and 
       spread to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most 
       momentous concern. 
 
Neder, 527 U.S., at 39-40 (quoting 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *350). 
 
5. Although I believe that Chief Judge Becker's concurrence may have 
much to commend it, it is not the rationale adopted by the majority 
opinion. I would therefore leave the question of the interpretation of the 
relevant drug statutes for decision in another case where the defendant's 
sentence is not inconsistent with the teaching of Apprendi, as the 
government concedes in this case. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I agree with Part I of Judge Sloviter's dissent. I write 
separately to express my view that the majority has written 
a new chapter in the book of plain error review of 
sentencing, and, I further suggest, has rewritten Apprendi 
and Williams. 
 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that the New Jersey 
statutory scheme "cannot stand," because, after the jury 
convicted the defendant of a second degree offense, the 
statute allowed a judge to impose punishment identical to 
what New Jersey provides for crimes of the first degree, 
provided that the judge found, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant's purpose for unlawfully 
possessing the weapon was to intimidate his victim on the 
basis of a particular characteristic the victim possessed. 
530 U.S. at 491-92. In Williams, we determined that an 
Apprendi error will only be found to have occurred if the 
judge actually imposes a sentence that is above a certain 
threshold, namely, the maximum sentence allowable for the 
crime of which the defendant was convicted. 235 F.3d at 
863. 
 
I submit that we ignore the teachings of both of these 
cases in issuing the majority opinion today. I say this 
because we are advocating the judicial determination of the 
proof that supports a certain sentence, contrary to the 
specific dictates of Apprendi, and we are forgetting that, in 
Williams, our analysis was based upon our view that an 
Apprendi error is a sentencing error, not an error that 
occurs at trial. I submit that the majority opinion writes a 
new chapter regarding plain error analysis in the 
sentencing context, because the law as it presently exists 
requires resentencing in the event that a sentence has been 
imposed in violation of the law, 18 U.S.C. S 3742,1 and even 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. S 3742(f)(1) provides: 
 
       (f) Sentence and disposition--If the court of appeals determines 
       that the sentence-- 
 
       (1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an 
       incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall 
       remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such 
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under the microscope of plain error review, we have had 
little difficulty noticing an error and remanding cases for 
resentencing where substantial rights were affected and the 
integrity of our system had been undermined by illegal 
sentences.2 
 
Today, we are not requiring a new sentencing proceeding, 
nor are we even saying that a new trial should occur, which 
could arguably follow from the logic and language of 
Apprendi. Rather, we search for a way to uphold an 
offensive, unconstitutional sentence, although there is no 
intimation in Apprendi that such a sentence can ever be 
countenanced, in the first instance, let alone preserved by 
the jurists' view of what may have occurred. 
 
The majority's discussion of the "substantial rights" or 
"prejudice" inquiry that we must make under plain error 
review does not focus on the tenor and logic of the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Apprendi,3 but, rather, it reaches out and 
follows the reasoning of Johnson and Neder. However, in 
doing so, the majority overlooks the fact that the Supreme 
Court in Apprendi never alludes to Johnson or Neder, and 
we, in Williams, never intimated that this is an appropriate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For example, we previously have addressed sentencing errors such as 
those implicated by a trial court's improper guideline calculation, and 
have found that such mistakes are sufficiently prejudicial to warrant 
relief under the plain error standard. E.g., United States v. Felton, 55 
F.3d 861, 869 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) ("This circuit and others have found 
that the miscalculation of a defendant's offense level `certainly is error 
that seriously affect[s] [the defendant's] rights, and so amounts to plain 
error.' ") (quoting United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 90 (3d Cir. 
1992) 
(alteration in original); Pollen, 978 F.2d at 90 ("The district court's 
improper calculation . . . , resulting in a significantly higher Guideline 
sentencing range, certainly is an error that seriously affected 
[defendant's] substantial rights and so amounts to plain error."). 
 
3. As the Supreme Court explained in Olano : 
 
       The third and final limitation on appellate authority under Rule 
       52(b) is that the plain error "affec[t] substantial rights." This 
is the 
       same language employed in Rule 52(a), and in most cases it means 
       that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected 
the 
       outcome of the judicial proceedings. 
 
507 U.S. at 734 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). 
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exercise. I submit that we were right in not doing so, since 
Johnson and Neder involved trial errors rather than 
sentencing errors such as that implicated in Apprendi and 
the instant case.4 Thus, the Court's method of analysis in 
those cases cannot be so easily imported into this distinctly 
different situation. 
 
In Johnson, the error at issue was the district court's 
failure, in a perjury prosecution, to submit the issue of 
materiality of the false statements to the jury. 520 U.S. at 
467. Rather than having the jury decide that issue, the 
district court instructed the jury that it had determined 
that the defendant's statements were material, and the 
defendant did not object to the instruction as such. On 
appeal, the defendant claimed that the district court 
committed plain error in failing to submit the issue of 
materiality to the jury, and that the error "rendered her 
conviction invalid" under Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 
464. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, and found 
that the error, while "plain," did not warrant correction 
under the last prong of Olano because there was 
"overwhelming" and "uncontroverted" evidence that the 
statement was material, and thus, the "fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of the judicial proceedings" would not be 
seriously affected by its failure to correct the error. Id. at 
470. The Court expressly noted the fact that correcting the 
error in such a case would yield the opposite result because 
it would require "the reversal of a conviction." Id. 
 
Neder involved the same error -- the failure to submit the 
element of materiality to the jury -- and the Court there 
determined that the error was subject to harmless error 
review. 527 U.S. at 8-9. In conducting its harmless 
error/prejudice inquiry, the Court applied the following test 
in view of the nature of the error at issue: "whether it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority states that we are presented with a combination of trial 
and sentencing errors. I am not sure what that means, and the majority 
has provided no supporting authority for its new category of error. Maj. 
Op. at 12. Clearly, we have a sentencing error, probably due to 
someone's error at trial -- most likely, the government's -- but I submit 
that there is no argument that the District Court actually committed 
error during the trial itself, and there has been no request for a new 
trial 
on that basis. 
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appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error  
complained of did not contribute to the verdict  obtained." 
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The Court answered that 
question by reference to the trial record, and concluded 
that "no jury could reasonably find" that the defendant's 
actions were not material. Id. at 16. 
 
Based on the Court's analysis in Neder, the majority 
pretends to ask the same question in assessing prejudice to 
the defendant, but it actually asks a different one:"whether 
[the sentence] would have been the same absent the failure 
to submit drug quantity for a jury determination." Maj. Op. 
at 16. However, given that I view the Apprendi  error as 
having occurred at sentencing, and given the question 
asked in Neder (if we really are to draw on Neder as a 
guide), the appropriate question to ask in assessing the 
third element of the plain error analysis under Olano is 
whether, in the context of the sentencing proceedings, it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the Apprendi error 
complained of -- sentencing a defendant to a greater term 
of imprisonment than that permitted under the law-- 
contributed to the sentence obtained. E.g., Sochor v. 
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540 (1992) (applying harmless error 
analysis and asking whether, in the context of the 
sentencing proceedings, a sentencing error " `was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt' in that `it did not contribute to 
the sentence obtained' ") (quoting Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 
49 (1992) (explaining when a sentencing error occurs, such 
as consideration of invalid aggravating circumstance, 
harmless error review requires courts to "actually perform 
a new sentencing calculus, if the sentence is to stand"); 
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319 (1991) (describing 
harmless error analysis in the context of sentencing 
proceedings as requiring a determination of whether the 
sentencing error "would have made no difference to the 
sentence"); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 753 
(1990) (stating that harmless error analysis in the context 
of sentencing proceedings must ask whether "it was beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the 
same" had there been no sentencing error). Plainly, the 
answer is "yes," because if the District Court had not 
sentenced Vazquez to more than the prescribed statutory 
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maximum for the offense for which he was convicted, he 
would have received less prison time than he actually 
received. Thus, his substantial rights were affected. 
 
Similarly, in assessing whether we should correct the 
error under the last prong of Olano, the issue is not, as it 
was in Johnson, whether the trial proofs indicate that the 
fairness and integrity of the trial proceedings  would not be 
impugned by the fact that judge rather than the jury made 
the determination at issue, given the strength of the 
evidence. Rather, given the language and logic of Apprendi, 
we should ask whether the error affected the sentencing in 
a way that affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial 
proceedings. And, unlike the situation presented in 
Johnson, our correction of the error would not result in the 
reversal of a conviction; rather, the remedy for the 
unconstitutionally imposed sentence is a remand for 
resentencing in accordance with the jury's verdict. 
 
Clearly, one cannot read Apprendi without realizing that, 
not only are substantial rights affected by the Apprendi 
sentencing error,5 but also the public reputation of judicial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As Judge Sloviter's dissent points out, several of our sister circuits 
have recognized that an Apprendi violation constitutes an error that 
affects a defendant's substantial rights. E.g. , United States v. 
Buckland, 
___ F.3d. ___, 2001 WL 893440, at *9, reh'g en banc granted, 2001 WL 
1091167 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001) ("Imposing a sentence that is seven 
years more than the maximum sentence constitutionally permitted 
under the facts as found by the jury undoubtedly seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Maynie, ___ F.3d ___, 
2001 WL 856142, at *8 (8th Cir. July 30, 2001) (finding "that greater, 
and improper, infringement of defendants' liberty substantially affected 
their rights"); United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 444 (5th Cir. 
2001) ("Because Appellants were sentenced to serve between 20-30 years 
of incarceration--considerably longer than the maximum sentences 
available pursuant to the jury determination under the federal drug 
offense statute, . . . the error clearly affected . . . substantial 
rights."); 
United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946, 955 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that "[t]he Apprendi error substantially prejudiced Noble's rights by 
extending his sentence 10 years in excess of the statutory maximum"); 
United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 544 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
"[t]here is no doubt that imposing additional years of imprisonment 
beyond that authorized by a jury's verdict affects a defendant's 
substantial rights"), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2002 (2001). 
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proceedings is affected by the sentencing of a defendant to 
more prison time than the maximum permissible based on 
the crime charged and the jury's verdict. In Apprendi, the 
focus was on New Jersey's statutory scheme, and the Court 
was not faced with having to apply Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) 
because the issue came before the Court on an appeal from 
a guilty plea entered in New Jersey state court. Thus, we 
must speculate from its language precisely what the Court 
really would do in a situation such as this. But the 
language in Apprendi does not make this a difficult 
exercise. There the Court referenced the differential in 
sentencing between what Apprendi would have received 
without the finding of a biased purpose, and what he could 
receive with it, stating that it was "more than a nominal 
effect." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495. The Court then stated: 
"Both in terms of absolute years behind bars, and because 
of the more severe stigma attached, the differential here is 
unquestionably of constitutional significance." 6 Id. It 
concluded its opinion by stating that "[t]he New Jersey 
procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable 
departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable 
part of our criminal justice system." Id. at 497. 
 
To my mind, in order to read Apprendi in a way that 
would be what the majority holds today, we would have to 
read into, or add to, the Court's closing statement the 
following: 
 
       Of course, on the other hand, if reasonable jurists can 
       determine from the record that the jury would have 
       found the necessary element or sentencing factor 
       beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury's actual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. As an aside, I should note that by concentrating on our divergence 
from Apprendi and Williams, I do not downplay the constitutional 
significance of the fact that Vazquez was never indicted for the crime for 
which he has been sentenced. As eloquently stated by Judge Motz in her 
powerful partial dissent in United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150 (4th 
Cir. 2001), the end result of the Apprendi violation meant that "the 
district court sentenced [the defendant] as if he had been indicted and 
convicted of a far more serious offense, imposing on[him] ten more years 
of imprisonment than the offense for which he was actually indicted and 
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       finding on that element, and its verdict, is not such an 
       indispensable part of our criminal justice system. In 
       such circumstances, the otherwise unconstitutional 
       sentence may nevertheless stand. 
 
I believe the tone and language of Apprendi preclude any 
such reading. In fact, the very language of Apprendi quoted 
by the majority seems to negate this idea. Maj. Op. at 7-8 
(stating that the Court in Apprendi "endorsed the following 
concept: `It is unconstitutional for the legislature to remove 
from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the 
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant 
is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be 
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' ") (quoting 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
If we follow the logic of the majority, the government can 
charge and convict a defendant of manslaughter, but 
sentence him for murder, and, as long as the government 
produced evidence at trial that would support that 
sentence, we would not notice or correct the error under 
Rule 52(b) and require resentencing in accordance with the 
jury's verdict. That result is not what Johnson  and Neder 
stand for, nor is it what the Supreme Court envisioned. 
E.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 190 (4th Cir. 
2001) (Motz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). If 
anything, it is just the opposite. In fact, in Apprendi, the 
Supreme Court noted disapprovingly, "Indeed, the effect of 
New Jersey's sentencing `enhancement' here is 
unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense into a first- 
degree offense under the state's own criminal code." 530 
U.S. at 494. 
 
For these reasons, I join in Judge Sloviter's dissent in 
Part I. 
 
However I disagree with Judge Sloviter's conclusion that 
the error is structural, because it is, again, a sentencing 
error. It did not occur until the sentence exceeding the 
maximum allowed was pronounced. The error did not 
"infect the entire trial process" and "unnecessarily render 
[the] trial fundamentally unfair." Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. I can 
find no Supreme Court opinion that suggests that a 
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sentencing error can be "structural." In fact, Judge Sloviter 
appears to fall somewhat into the trial error trap of Neder 
and Johnson in her discussion in Part II, when she speaks 
of the need for the jury, not the judge, to determine the 
offense. While that is the nature of the discussion in 
Apprendi, because it focuses on the statutory scheme, in 
light of Williams, that is not the nature of the error before 
us. What kind of error is it if a defendant is sentenced to 
a term greater than the maximum allowable for that 
offense? I submit that it is a sentencing error, that it is 
constitutional, not structural, and that the error is plain in 
any event. 
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